Alice is not missing wonderland the eastward enlargement of the European Union by Prokopijević Miroslav
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Miroslav Prokopijevi}*
ALICE IS NOT MISSING WONDERLAND
THE EASTWARD ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
APSTRAKT: U ovom radu poku{a}u da
poka`em da pro{irenje EU iz 2004. godine
ne predstavlja dobar ekonomski potez za
osam novih ~lanica iz centralne i isto~ne
Evrope (CIE). Malo je verovatno da }e
nove ~lanice dobiti ve}e direktne strane
investicije, ubrzati svoj ekonomski rast i
susti}i bogatije zemlje EU, mada se o tome
na{iroko govorilo i u akademskim krugov-
ima i u "propagandi EU za sre}u".
Ispostavlja se da su subvencije EU, koje je
trebalo da neutrali{u tro{kove pridru-
`ivanja, beskorisne, ako ne i {tetne po
ekonomije koje ih primaju, jer menjaju
strukturu podsticaja. Dakle, umesto da
budu nagra|ene za pridru`ivanje, nove
~lanice }e biti dvostruko ka`njene. Najpre,
ni`im nivoom direktnih stranih investicija
i istrajnim zaostajanjem BDP, a zatim i
dobijanjem subvencija koje pogor{avaju
situaciju. ^lanice iz CIE bile bi u boljem
polo`aju da su ostale izvan EU i da i dalje
unapre|uju ekonomsku slobodu i
po{tovanje zakona. Ali, ~ak i nakon
pridru`ivanja, jo{ uvek ima prostora za
objektivne ciljeve zemalja CIE, zahvalju-
ju}i nenameravanim posledicama sistema
pridru`ivanja zemalja iz biv{eg socijal-
isti~kog bloka.
ABSTRACT: In this paper I will try to
show that the EU enlargement from 2004
is not a good economic move for eight
newcomers from Central and Eastern
Europe (CEECs). It is unlikely that new-
comers will get larger FDI, speed up their
economic growth and catch up with rich-
er EU countries, although this was broad-
ly advertised both academically and by
the EU “propaganda for happiness.” The
EU subsidies, intended to offset accession
costs, turn out to be useless if not damag-
ing for acceding economies, because they
change the structure of incentives. So,
instead of being rewarded for accession,
accession countries are going to be pun-
ished twice. Firstly, by lower FDI and a
persisting GDP gap. Secondly, by getting
subsidies which worsen the situation.
CEECs would be better off staying outside
the EU and continuing to improve eco-
nomic freedom and the rule of law. But
even after they have acceded, there is still
some space for reasonable objectives of
the CEECs, due to unintended conse-
quences of the socialist enlargement
design.
ORIGINALNI NAU^NI RADOVI/SCIENTIFIC PAPERS
* Nau~ni savetnik, Centar za slobodno tr`i{te, BeogradAfter more than 10 years of transition from communism to constitutional
market democracy, eight countries from the Central and East Europe (CEECs)
became members of the European Union (EU) on May 1, 2004.
1 Even before
transition countries joined the Union, the main bulk of academic production in
the field recommended integration by saying it was a good thing both for the
Union and for these countries - in political, economic and any other sense
2. One
group of academic writers conceptualized full membership as a panacea for all
CEEC problems – like Alice’s trip to Wonderland. This probably had to do with
the prevailing mentality in the CEECs and the rational constructivism of the
European official academia. The EU bodies contributed to such a picture with
their own “propaganda for happiness”, which ignored or diminished problems
and glorified the allegedly positive aspects of accession – a practice well known
from the communist past. Strongly interested people cannot produce a balanced
view. Intellectuals from acceding transition countries and the EU profit due to a
higher demand for their services before, during and after accession. Eurocrats
from Brussels profit from being paid well, for extending their rule to ten addi-
tional countries and running the game of EU25, which is less accountable than
ever before. And some interest groups get subsidies.
The main finding of this paper is that for economically successful transition
countries it would have been better to stay outside the EU, and to continue to
improve the rule of law and economic freedom. This would be “first best” for the
CEECs. But even after some CEECs have joined the Union they need not be
delivered at the mercy of Eurocrats, since there is some space inside the Union
for pursuing the abovementioned reasonable objectives, either due to the nature
of integration or due to some unintended consequences of the “fifth enlarge-
ment” from 2004. Acceding to the EU and fighting from inside for more eco-
nomic freedom emerges as “second best”. Inferior to “second best” is to accept
heavy regulation and rent-seeking policies in exchange for subsidies and to join
the over-regulated economies of the EU15.
E
k
o
n
o
m
s
k
i
 
a
n
a
l
i
 
b
r
 
1
6
5
,
 
a
p
r
i
l
 
2
0
0
5
.
 
-
 
j
u
n
 
2
0
0
5
.
34
Miroslav Prokopijevi}
1 By working on this study I have enjoyed the generous hospitality of the ICER, under whose
hospices it was published as Working Paper No. 32/2004 of International Centre for Economic
Research, Villa Gualino, Viale Settimio Severo, 63, 10133 Torino - Italy. I would like to thank
Enrico Colombatto (ICER & Turin university), Svetozar Pejovich (Professor emeritus at the
Texas A & M University), Slavisa Tasic (Free market center), Simon Teitel (Simon Teitel and
Associates) and several participants at the EACES 2004-conference for helpful comments.
Usual caveat applies.
2 “It is commonly accepted view that further integration with the European structures will be
beneficial to the CEECs in a political and economic sense.” Maliszewska 2004, p. 6.In what follows, I will first consider the main economic reasons in favor of
the CEECs joining the Union
3. So, the advocates of the eastward enlargement
pointed out that the CEE entrants would profit in economic terms for a number
of reasons by:
i) getting larger investment and especially FDI;
4
ii) increasing their growth rates and bridging the gap with the rest of the
Union;
5
iii) getting subsidies in order to offset accession costs.
None of that is true as we are going to show below (in the same order).
I. HIGHER FDI
Let us first consider the question of FDI. This will be divided into two steps.
In step one I will consider what happens with FDI
6 for selected newcomers until
shortly before accession, since the post-accession data are not available now. Step
two draws an analogy with the flow of FDI in some EU15 countries that were
similar (i.e., less developed than other EU countries) to transition countries
when they acceded some decades ago.
After the collapse of communism CEECs entered transition and started mar-
ket reforms. Private investors reacted very positively to this change, especially
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Alice is not missing Wonderland
3 “The enlargement of the European Union will have a positive impact on the economy of
acceding countries. (…) EU enlargement is expected to provide a significant further boost to
economic growth and prosperity in acceding countries.” European Commission 2003, p. 5-6.
This view has strongly dominated the field and has been supported by larger think-tanks
(Tinbergen institute, EUI, CESifo, WIIW, Jean Monet Center, ZEI, Robert Schuman
Foundation, British CPS), the most frequently used textbooks on the EU (see books by D.
Dinan, A. M. El-Agraa, Feldman & Watson, N. Nugent, Schneider & Aspinwall, D. Swann, W.
& H. Wallace), by stuff at the university departments for European studies and by the most
important non-market funds like IMF, WB, EBRD.
4 “…it is obvious that integration does have a positive effect on trade and foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) flows”. Kaitila 2004, p. 26. Breus (2000) estimated that, with full EU membership,
FDI into CEECs could increase by up to 1.5 percentage points per year.
5 “Full membership /of the CEECs/ is expected to accelerate economic growth via increased for-
eign direct investment (FDI), new trade within the enlarged EU, and aid from the EU budget,
and other channels.” CESifo, 2004, p. 96. Wagner & Hloushova (2002) expect that even poor-
er members of EU25 will catch up in three or four decades. Lajour & oth. (2001) predict 9%
and 5.8% rise of GDP for Hungary and Poland after accession, while Maliszewska (2004, p.
42) predicts a rise of GDP for two countries of 7% and 3.4% respectively. CESifo (2004, p. 99)
cites even higher growth figures after accession that were stated by the EU Commission and
some other studies.
6 One has to bear in mind that a small fraction of FDI may stem from foreign governments and
nonmarket funds like the WB and EBRD, while the majority of FDI is a private investment.where it was fast and deep. Since transition countries had not had enough accu-
mulated capital they were directed to import it. FDI is a fast way of transferring
know-how, organizational and managerial practices and creating products for
the world market, but above all it is a crucial indicator of a country’s integration
into the global division of labor. In order to attract private FDI, countries needed
to develop a good business environment, and how good they were at doing that
is to be seen from the table below. As expected, FDI was generally on the rise in
the CEECs throughout the 1990-ies, but it started to decline in 2002-2003. FDI
peaked in CEECs in 2000 or 2001, while Hungary had two peaks in 1993 and
2001.
7 The peak for CEECs as a group was in 2002.
By designing policies to attract FDI in the 1990-ies some countries used sub-
sidies
8 that were not legal according to EU law
9. Even before accession, accession-
candidates started to change their legislation in order to adjust it to the EU regu-
lations
10. Some investors anticipated a loss of subsidies and decided to leave can-
didate countries or not to go there in the first place. For that reason Hungary,
Czech republic, Poland and Slovakia had lower FDI in 2003, compared to 2002.
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7 FDI in Hungary was negative in 2003, since the data do not include reinvested profit. FDI does
include inter-company loans.
8 A large majority of CEECs has used different subsidies (tax relief, financial assistance, proper-
ty grants, provision of utilities, training, etc.) in order to attract more investment and especial-
ly FDI. For example, the Czech government approved in 1998. a package of incentives includ-
ing corporate tax relief for 10 years (newly established firms) or partial tax relief (established
companies), job creation grants, training grants, the provision of industrial property at low
prices and infrastructure support.
9 Beyond Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and structural funds, the EU in general does not
allow so called direct subsidies, but it tolerates so called horizontal subsidies, i.e. those that
benefit many (all) firms, and not just those that otherwise get some subsidy. It also allows sub-
sidies for extremely underdeveloped regions (like ex-German Democratic Republic) or for
depopulated regions, like northern parts of Sweden or Finland.
10 For example, special Slovak incentives for foreign investors or 10-year tax holidays were abol-
ished in 2002.
State  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Chech r.  -  -  -  983  563  749  2526  1276  1275  1275  3591  4477  5600  9300  3500 
Estonia  -  -  -  80  156  212  199  111  130  574  222  241  307  307  800 
Hungary  187  311  1459  1471  2328  1097  4410  1987  1653  1453  1414  1650  2730  1281  -85 
Poland  -  0  117  284  580  542  1134  2741  3041  4966  6348  9299  6377  4335  3500 
Slovakia  10  24  82  100  107  236  194  199  84  374  701  1500  1763  4620  700 
Total  197  335  1658  2918  3734  2836  8463  6314  6183  8642  12276  17167  16777  19843  8415 
Table 1: FDI in transition countries, 1989-2003, in million dollars.
Source: EBRD, Transition report, 2002; Global development finance 2004 (World Bank) for 2002 and
2003. Own calculation.Total FDI in five countries fell from $ 19.8bn in 2002 to $ 8.4bn in 2003. FDI was
only on the rise in Estonia in 2003 compared with 2002. By putting aside the
question of opacity in defining and using subsidies in the EU, it needs to be
added that the provision of subsidies to firms is also a transfer from some gov-
ernment or non-market funds to firms partially to cover differential costs. It
turned out to be a transfer to largely foreign owners. All subsidies, including
those to attract FDI, are the activity of considerable losses, some of them dead-
weight. It was a positive step of CEECs to remove part of subsidies, even if this
happened because of an enforcement of EU law rather than on their own initia-
tive. However, the fact that it is good to remove subsidies for FDI does not make
true the expectation that FDI is going to rise due to accession. All those that
accepted such a view acted on all other considerations rather than factual ones.
In 2004 and thereafter FDI in eight new members will be significantly lower
compare to the peak in 2002. 
The loss of subsidies was just one important factor for lower FDI in CEECs.
Another may be the heavier regulation that was expected to be imposed on
CEECs before and after accession. Some of the accession costs originating in reg-
ulation will be discussed later on. For now it suffices to say that the loss of subsi-
dies and higher operation costs after accession were the main factors for more
than halving FDI in CEECs in 2003 compared to 2002.
One may just partly accept my view and still say that FDI declined in the
whole world after 2000, and that this trend explains the deterioration in FDI in
newcomers more strongly than EU membership and the loss of subsidies do.
FDI was halved in 2001 compared to 2000, but the same move cannot be
observed in the CEECs. On the contrary, FDI rose in four out of five observed
CEECs in 2001 compared to 2000, and fell in just one. The total FDI in five
CEECs was significantly higher in 2002 than in 2001 – again contrary to the
world trend. FDI started to decline in accession countries in 2003 – with the
exception of Estonia – and this was precisely due to their anticipation of EU-
membership and non-allowed subsidies. From that it seems obvious that acces-
sion rather than a worldwide decline in FDI caused a decline in FDI in transition
newcomers, and this goes contrary to what was stated both in academic produc-
tions and the political “propaganda for happiness”. 
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Alice is not missing Wonderland
1990/94  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
197.7  327.9  372.9  461.4  690.4  1076.6  1498.8  823  654  575 
Table 2: FDI in the world, in billion dollars
Source: IMF 2003. p. 10. For years 1990-94 an average is counted; for years 2001-03, see EIU 2004, p9Let us now go to the second step. As the cases of less developed new entrants
in the EU once upon time, like Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, clearly show,
FDI rose just temporarily due to the accession, and went back to the preaccession
level after some 8-10 years, so that accession did not matter in the long run. In
Greece FDI even halved when the country became an EU-member in 1981. On
the vertical axis in the next figure FDI is represented as a percentage of the GDP,
while on the horizontal axis is represented the time of accession (t), with periods
of 5 years prior (t-5) and 5 and 10 years after accession (t+5, t+10).
The above figure shows that FDI in Greece dropped, while that of Ireland,
Portugal and Spain grew temporarily for some 8 years between t and t+10, and
thereafter went down to pre-accession levels
11. However, in Greece, Ireland,
Portugal and Spain there was no deterioration in FDI prior to accession such as
had happened in the transition newcomers mentioned earlier. Two factors
explain this observation. The EU regulation was not as extensive (expensive) at
the time when Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain acceded as it is now.
Secondly, the EU policy toward the FDIsubsidies was not restrictive before, as it
is now. Subsidies for FDI were broadly used two or three decades ago among the
EU-members and in the 1990-ies they were outlawed due to the establishment of
the common market. 
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Source: World economic outlook, IMF 2001, ch. 4, p. 150.
11 Although temporary rise cannot prove the case for higher FDI, it represents a gain for the
economy in question as long as it lasts.The conclusion from both steps above is straightforward. Advance in eco-
nomic freedom and the rule of law is the main factor in attracting FDI rather
than accession to the EU. The reason for this is very simple. Private investors are
interested in a good business environment rather than in accession that brings
about more regulation, costly adjustments and more power of bureaucracy over
the economy.
12
Without larger changes in design of economic institutions CEECs are unlike-
ly to attract more FDI. A survey among international business people, conducted
by T Th he e   E Ec co on no om mi is st t   I In nt te el ll li ig ge en nc ce e   U Un ni it t, cooled off high expectations related to FDI in
CEECs. “The survey offers little support for the theory that EU enlargement will
lead to a new surge of FDI inflows into the new entrants”
13. CEECs have already
achieved the main benefits of integration for investment and “further positive
changes to business environments associated with EU membership will be
small”
14. Stagnation in the size of FDI on a world level, and increasingly tough
competition from Asia in particular, are the main external factors.
II. BRIDGING THE GDP GAP
Considerations relating to what is going to happen with the GDP gap of
acceding countries from the CEE are also divided in two steps. Firstly, I will pre-
sent the evidence related to GDP-development in EU newcomers from the CEE.
Secondly, I will consider what happened with the GDP gap in Greece, Ireland,
Portugal and Spain when these countries became the EU members.
GDP fell sharply in transition countries during 1991-3, due to costly market
reforms, and 1994 was the first year of GDP growth in a majority of the eight
acceding transition countries. Post-reform recession in the Baltic countries last-
ed until 1993-4, since they entered transition later on. Taking into account the
period 1994-2003, the champions of growth are Latvia, Poland, Slovak republic
and Estonia, followed by Slovenia and Hungary, with Lithuania and Czech
republic at the end.
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Alice is not missing Wonderland
12 This is clear not just to pro-market economists but also to objective euro-optimists: “The
preferential access to EU markets, coupled with the liberalization of Central and East
European countries’ domestic markets, has promoted changes of specialization patterns in
these countries. However, national options in terms of economic policy have constrained the
rhythm and intensity of those changes. Those who adopted more radical liberalizing reforms,
and applied wider programs of privatization and macroeconomic stabilization have attracted
higher amounts of FDI and have progressed more in economic terms.” Caetano et alii, 2002,
p. 5.
13 EIU 2004, p. 14.
14 EIU 2004, p. 13.The picture of transition champions is very different if we consider the num-
ber of years for which some countries had above average growth rate in eight
CEECs after 1994. In that case, Estonia and Latvia are at the top with 7 such years
each, followed by Lithuania (6), Poland (5), Slovakia (4), Hungary (3), Slovenia
(2) and Czech republic (1). Poland had all good years in 1995-1999, while all
three Baltic countries grow faster than the CEE-8 group in 2001, 2002 and 2003.
Slovakia is the only one of the remaining five countries, except for the Baltic
states, that had grown above average in 2002 and 2003. This means that the Baltic
states – as least those that are considered to be less developed among 8 CEE new-
comers – bridged the gap faster than other transition countries and even the
EU15.
15
The growth rate in eight EU newcomers has been significantly higher than
growth rate in EU15 or the Eurozone from 1995 onwards. With the exception of
Ireland, no other EU15-country has grown faster than the eight CEE countries.
This means that selected CEECs started to bridge the gap with the EU15 before
they became EU members. However, as can be seen from Table 3, growth rate in
eight EU newcomers has been in decline from 2000 to the present – it was 4.65%,
4.19%, 4.11% and 3.76% in 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003 respectively. Eight new-
comers were obliged to accept costly EU-regulation progressively, well ahead of
accession, and this had a deteriorating effect on economic freedom, economic
activity and consequently on GDP growth. Some tentative estimates stated that
these costs of adjustment might go up to 10-12% of country’s GDP. The topic,
however, was never researched exhaustively and precisely, so that we will never
find out what the real total cost of accession of eight newcomers was. There are,
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15 A country growing at 2% needs 35 years to double its GDP. Growth rate of 4% requires 17.5
years while growth rate of 7% requires 10.3 years to double GDP
Country  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  1994- 
2003
1 
Chech r.  -  -  0.1  2.2  5.9  4.3  -0.8  -1.0  0.5  3.3  3.1  2.0  1.7  2.12 
Estonia  -7.9  -21.6  -8.2  -1.8  4.3  3.9  9.8  4.6  -0.6  7.1  5.0  5.8  5.0  4.12 
Lithuan.  -5.7  -21.3  -16.2  -9.8  3.3  4.7  7.0  7.3  -1.8  4.0  6.5  6.7  5.8  3.37 
Latvia  -11.1  -35.2  -14.9  0.6  -0.8  3.7  8.4  4.8  2.8  6.8  7.9  6.1  5.5  4.58 
Poland  -7.0  2.6  4.3  5.2  6.8  6.0  6.8  4.8  4.1  4.0  1.0  1.4  2.9  4.30 
Hungary  -11.9  -3.1  -0.6  2.9  1.5  1.3  4.6  4.9  4.2  5.2  3.8  3.3  3.0  3.47 
Slovakia  -  -  -3.7  4.9  6.5  5.8  5.6  4.0  1.3  2.2  3.3  4.4  4.0  4.20 
Slovenia  -  -  2.8  5.3  4.9  3.5  4.6  3.8  5.2  4.6  2.9  3.2  2.2  4.03 
Average  -8.72  -16.24  -4.55  1.19  4.05  4.15  5.75  4.15  1.96  4.65  4.19  4.11  3.76  3.77 
 
Table 3: GDP growth in transition newcomers to the EU, in %.
Source: The World Bank files (Internet) for years 1991-1994; IMF World economic outlook 2003.
Statistical appendix, p. 183, for years 1995-2003. Note: 1=average; estimates for 2003. Own calculations.however, some more or less complete estimates, and some of them are cited in
this paper. Anyway, if transition newcomers continue to bridge the gap after
accession, this is going to happen despite membership rather than because of
membership.
In order to find out what is going to happen to the GDP gap in transition
countries after accession, let us consider what happened with the GDP gap in less
developed countries that joined the Union a long time ago - like Greece, Ireland,
Portugal and Spain.
16
Since its first enlargement in 1973, the EU bodies have stated that accession
helps less developed countries to overcome backwardness, to narrow the gap and
finally to catch up with more developed members. It seems that membership as
such induces convergence in GDP and the standard of living. If this had hap-
pened before with less developed countries like Greece, Ireland, Portugal and
Spain, this might be expected to happen to transition countries as well
17. Table 4
summarizes evidence related to the GDP gap. Spain and Portugal narrowed the
gap moderately; Ireland did the same explosively, while only Greece stagnated.
The level of the Greek GDP per capita compared to the EU average stagnated
throughout the observed period, both before and after the country acceded the
Union. This happened despite the fact that Greece received significant subsidies
from Brussels of between 2% and 5% of GDP per annum. When left-wing forces
got rid of the dictatorship in the early 1970-ies, and when Greece became a
democracy, the government designed policies to reward the main liberators’
interest groups, which required very high state expenditures, and redistribution
policies that deteriorated growth and allowed only modest growth rates. By
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16 The investigation of the effects of trade creation and trade diversion is omitted, since it is relat-
ed to the question whether actual EU-candidates were eventually close to the level of market
protection or even above. See, Gross & Gonciarz 1996.
17 Ireland has acceded in 1973, together with UK and Denmark, Greece joined in 1981, while
Portugal and Spain joined in 1986.
Country  1975  1985  1995  2001 
Greece  62  64  66  65 
Ireland  66  69  93  118 
Portugal  56  57  70  69 
Spain  82  74  78  84 
Table 4: Convergence in EU15, selected countries and years
(GDP p pe er r   c ca ap pi it ta a, ,   EU15=100)
Source: Barysch 2003. p. 5, according to the OECD and Eurostat data.entering the EU Greece even worsened its economic policies – in exchange for
costly adjustments in regulation Greece got subsidies from the EU. As a result,
the country’s distance in terms of GDP pc remained the same both before and
after accession.
18
Ireland has passed two phases while being in the EU. First, it stagnated for
more than a decade, again despite accession and a lot of EU subsidies. Second,
Ireland prospered after the mid-1980ies and soon surpassed the EU average
income. This happened due to a huge improvement in economic freedom rather
than accession. As a result, after larger economic reforms were conducted in
Ireland from the mid- 1980ies on, Ireland’s GDP increased at an average rate of
5.14% from 1990 to 1995, and it increased at an average rate of 9.66% from 1996
to 2000. Empirical evidence clearly suggests that subsidies from Brussels have not
been the major cause of Ireland’s economic success.
19
To sum up, all four considered cases show that membership in the EU per se
does not mean solid growth rates and “catch up” policies. Growth rates result
from liberalization policies rather than from the EU membership. The regulation
required by membership makes business transactions more costly and deterio-
rates growth. Without larger advances in economic freedom countries remain
stagnant despite EU membership. Subsidies from Brussels cannot induce sus-
tainable growth, if any. Governments benefit more from granting subsidies to
their political supporters than by directing them to the most profitable projects.
We are going to see later on that subsidies have a negative impact on a subsidized
economy because they change the structure of incentives and retard growth. For
now we may conclude that the expected large rise of GDP after accession was a
myth in the past and that it is not likely to be very different with CEECs in the
near future. Membership alone and subsidies from Brussels cannot help the eight
transition countries in developing “catch-up” policies. If they have such an
objective, they need to introduce policies to improve economic freedom and the
rule of law. EU membership is not an obstacle for such policies per se, as the cases
of more liberal EU members show, like UK, Ireland or Luxembourg. Provided
governments are committed to reform and ready to pay for its cost, advances in
economic freedom and the rule of law are possible. It is questionable, however,
whether governments may resist rent-seeking policies strengthened by a flow of
Brussels’ subsidies that change the structure of incentives.
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18 Ironically, the fastest tempo of development after IIWW Greece experienced under dictator-
ship 1954- 1974. with average growth rate of 7%, when it conducted sound economic policies.
Cf. Prokopijevic 2002, p. 17-18.
19 Cf. Powell 2003, p. 431.III. SUBSIDIES TO OFFSET ACCESSION COSTS
In contrast to apparent disadvantages for transition newcomers flowing from
the accession, which are kept far away from publicity, transfers from the EU to
newcomers are highly publicized. They are the basic element of the “propaganda
for happiness” that is systematically conducted from Brussels. Let us for now
accept official EU propaganda that subsidies are useful. Transfers are limited to
4% of countries’ GDP, and it is said that newcomers will profit more from the
EU single market. However, newcomers profited from the common market long
before they acceded, after they had contracted “Europe agreements” in the 1990s,
which allowed free trade between them and EU15.
What is concerning about the subsidy of up to 4% of GDP, is that it is highly
unlikely that newcomers will get it, since the CEE countries by entering the EU
will contribute 1.20% of their GDP to the EU budget, which reduces the net sub-
sidy from 4% to 2.80% of their respective GDP. It is also questionable what part
of the 2.80% subsidy new entrants will get, especially in the first years after acces-
sion, since their “absorption capacity” is low, according to the EU bodies, due to
poorly prepared institutions for that operation. But even if newcomers get subsi-
dies of up to 2.80%, this is bad news for their economies due to a number of
adverse effects. 
By entering the EU, firms from newcomers undergo quotas intended to
reduce the production of some goods and services, which causes a net loss to
newcomers’ economies. Quotas do restrain firms in some areas (agriculture, tex-
tile, steel, fishery) to accede to the EU market, and these restrictions are negotiat-
ed before accession. For example, Poland and Czech Republic should reduce
steel production for 1.2 m/t and 0.6 m/t respectively in the period 1996-2007.
20
Similar restrictions hold for other members. The EU Commission will monitor
the implementation of reduction. Actually, wherever subsidies exist, overpro-
duction is encouraged, and restraints like quotas are needed. During negotia-
tions, Slovakia asked to produce 1.2bn litres of subsidized milk, but the EU set
the limit at 950m litres per year. Slovakia wished to raise 400,000 sheep, but the
EU set the limit at 218,000. According to Hungarian party Fidesz, Hungarian
agriculture alone may lose up to $ 6bn over the next ten years due to trade
restraints.
21 Accession related trade restrictions will have especially bad effects on
the economically most liberal transition country. “Estonia will have to erect a
vast wall of common external tariffs against non-EU countries, starting this year
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20 Cf. Perlitz 2003, p. 13, 14. Poland should reduce the number of employees in the steel sector
from 23,000 to 16,000 from 1996 to 2007. Ibid, p. 13-14./2000/, jumping from last year’s baseline of zero to a total of 10,794 different tar-
iffs. This will result in serious distortions, and will particularly increase the cost
of food. (…) /Also/ upon accession Estonia will have to introduce a panoply of
EU non-tariff barriers (e.g., subsidies, quotas, and antidumping duties) that will
divert imports form low cost locations outside the EU to high-cost locations
within it. In particular, imports of coal and steel will become more expensive.”
22
Before starting accession adjustment, Estonia had a 0% customs rate and no
non-tariff barriers. In addition, and contrary to other CEECs facing an annual
financial burden of 2-3% for meeting environmental regulations, Estonia’s envi-
ronmental costs are estimated to be of the order of 4 to 5 percent of GDP.
23
Probably, the most damaging effect of accession consists in imposing very
tight regulation over incoming economies, which is unnecessary and is merely
intended to offset their comparative advantage, basically consisting of a cheaper
labor force, less regulation, and lower taxes. The most costly are the regulations
related to the labor market, environmental protection, consumer protection,
administrative and judicial standards. For example, environmental regulations
will impose a cost of up € 120bn on eight CEECs until 2015. This means that
CEECs will have to cover environmental expenditures at around € 10bn per year,
which again is equal to annual net transfers from the EU15 to newcomers. The
cost of confronting Poland just with the EU environmental standards is estimat-
ed at € 40bn over the transitional period that ends in 2015.
24 It is an amount
equal to the whole Polish budget. The EU Commission estimates
25 that costs of
the environmental regulation alone will consume between 2% and 3% of the
CEECs’ annual GDP during transition period of 7 years. 
Eventual application of the European regulations to newcomers’ labor mar-
kets will cause a larger jump in labor costs, which is going to affect adversely the
demand for labor. Firms are going to be affected by costly regulations and in
combination with higher labor and environmental costs this will raise both start-
up and operational costs and impair the country’s competitiveness. Less demand
for labor will lead to larger unemployment, higher start-up and labor costs will
lead to fewer new firms than would otherwise have been the case, and lower busi-
ness formation will inhibit the economy, slow down growth rates, and degener-
ate the business environment. Lower competitiveness will reduce market return
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21 Cf. Tupy 2003, p. 11.
22 Razeen Sally, cited according Tupy 2003, p. 15.
23 Cf. CESifo 2004, p. 103.
24 Cf. Walsh, 39.
25 Environment, EU Commission, at the site:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/negotiations/chapters/chap22/index.htmland continue to have a negative dynamic impact on the economy.
26 This clearly
contradicts bridge-the-gap-policies. 
Bureaucrats from the EU15 worry about a flood of workers from the new-
comers. The best way to keep workers at home is to allow them to get a good job
in their home country. However, costly regulation that is going to be imposed on
newcomers will not just reduce the number of jobs available; it will also keep
workers from newcomers relatively poor for longer than necessary, by slowing
down economic growth, and thus increase worker flight to higher-wage coun-
tries. As it is well known, doors to higher-wage countries for workers from new-
comers will be closed for 7 years, so that newcomers will have to bear the cost of
higher unemployment.
27 Ex East Germany provides a very good example of what
happens when a country gets high salaries and unnecessary but costly labor and
other regulation. In 2004, despite a transfer of € 1.2 trillion from West Germany
following reunification of the country, the unemployment rate in the Eastern
part is more than twice as high as it is in the Western part. Something similar
awaits the CEE newcomers if they accept business regulation at the French-
German level.
In exchange for losing comparative advantages through regulation and quo-
tas, newcomers will get subsidies of up to 2.80% of GDP, which are unlikely to
offset their losses, and which are going to change their economic environment
over time, by providing incentives for more subsidies
28, regulation, rent seeking
and arbitration over economy. This will result in lower competitiveness and pro-
ductivity, and in a decline of risk-taking and innovation, the driving forces of
modern economies. If a firm can earn more income from Brussels than from the
market, it will invest less in becoming more efficient (competitive) and it will
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26 In addition, transition newcomers will get economic policies on which they have no influence.
For example, the CAP (Common agricultural policy) was defined for the period 2006-2013.
before new entrants have arrived. It is unlikely that the CAP is going to be essentially changed
from now, although it is well known for being ecologically harmful, economically inefficient
and legally unjust, since it favors the largest farms. 
27 Unemployment rate in CEECs moved on average for 2002-2004. between 5.8% in Slovenia
and Hungary, and 16.5% and 20% in Slovakia and Poland respectively. Cf. CESifo 2004, p.
104. Unemployment figures are likely to raise in CEECs, not just because of more expensive
regulation. Agricultural sector in CEECs employs 7-25% total working force. Since this sector
will shrink to the 3- 5% EU-level in the next years, surplus labor will join those that are already
unemployed.
28 Incentives undergo changes for all actors in a society – citizens, politicians, bureaucrats, firms,
NGO, non-market funds, national and international organizations, interest groups, business
associations, unions.prefer to invest in lobbying and bribing bureaucrats controlling and distributing
the EU money. 
Both managers (owners) and bureaucrats will be engaged in non-productive
activity. Subsidies from Brussels will decrease incentives of the government to
conduct reforms. National and international bureaucrats will spend others’
money and they both are well known for being ignorant where to invest.
29
Otherwise, they would be rich by being successful entrepreneurs and would not
be bureaucrats at all. 
The use of subsidies requires regulation (tariff, non-tariff barriers, export
subsidy, protective price, etc.), which suspends market forces by implementing
restrictions, prohibitions, non-necessary procedures, bureaucratic arbitration,
government policies. This hinders whole sectors from developing and raises the
cost of business operation.
30 It requires a larger increase of bureaucrats on all lev-
els – from municipality to Brussels. Enlarged echelon of clerks will require fur-
ther enlargement in monitoring, auditing, anti-fraud and similar agencies.
Instead of doing something productive all these people will live at the expense of
taxpayers. Due to the “democratic deficit”, the bureaucratic echelon will develop
as an uncontrollable machine extracting money. But instead of being controlled,
Eurocrats plan to hire 5161 new bureaucrats in the CEE to monitor newcomers’
compliance with the acquis. Instead of being more controlled, bureaucrats will
extend their own control over the economy and the electorate.
Predictably, corruption prospers in such an environment. The larger role of
bureaucrats in economic life goes hand in hand with corruption opportunities.
“A senior partner at Ernst and Young calculated that around five per cent of the
Commission’s budget – or almost – 4 billion – goes missing every year, but even
this may well underestimate the scale of the problem”.
31 Having this in mind,
anti-corruption policies and measures should be well designed and tight.
However, this is not the case. Cases of corruption involving EU bodies are
unlikely to be investigated, publicized and prosecuted, since the investigation is
impossible without the authorities in member states, and member states are
short of incentives to conduct such an investigation. If they discover corruption
and find offenders, they have to compensate damage to the EU funds and to
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29 Cf. Stanchev et alii, 2004.
30 Firms and whole sectors can miss-invest in order to capture subsidies and this miss-allocation
will be covered by taxpayers. The harm is doubled, first for miss-allocation, second, for the
prize (subsidy) for that. Employees will be engaged in lobbying, strikes, threat of strikes,
cheating and bribes instead of in productive efforts leading to innovation, efficiency and
growth. 
31 Cf. Blundell & Frost, 2004, p. 27.punish actors. By doing so, member states will cause losses and troubles to them-
selves. First, by imposing fines over themselves, their budget will face a financial
loss. Second, it is not easy to punish influential bureaucrats and to avoid political
clashes and unrest in the bureaucratic echelon. Third, by fighting corruption,
some interest groups will face losses and will not accept that without counterac-
tion. Having all this in mind it is clear why Eurocracy keeps a low profile on cor-
ruption, and why some action emerges only when things go too far, as happened
in March 1999 with the resignation of Santer’s Commission.
32
As was already pointed out, subsidies are highly publicized, while the costs of
subsidies and negotiations on imposing trade restrictions and regulations are
not. The truth is that subsidies from Brussels are just a fraction of what newcom-
ers lose due to regulation and quotas. Although total transfers from the EU15 to
ten newcomers exceed € 40bn for years 2004-2006, the net transfer per year over
the same period is likely to be € 10-12bn.
33 As we have seen, environmental costs
alone offset the amount of net transfers – not to mention other costs. But even if
subsidies were larger, this would not offset the losses, since this money would
flow from bureaucrats rather than from markets, making economies even more
dependent on bureaucrats than on markets in the next round, and changing the
structure of incentives in the economy. Bureaucrats spend money according to
political objectives rather than according to economic efficiency, which again
enhances corruption, stealing, unfair auctions and other forms of funds’ misuse.
All this game with subsidies – unfriendly to market forces – might be tolerat-
ed provided there is some point in it. However, this is missing. Greece champi-
oned in subsidies from Brussels in per capita terms during the past two decades,
but despite all it has remained the poorest EU15 country. Ireland, its poor com-
panion some two decades ago, contrary to Greece, has relied on market reforms
rather than on subsidies. As a result, Ireland is today the second richest country
in the EU25, just behind Luxembourg. When the EU started disbursing aid
through structural and cohesion funds, 44% of the EU population lived in
regions that qualified for it. By 1997 that percentage increased to nearly 52%,
which shows that the program not only failed to promote growth but spread
stagnation and decline even beyond targeted regions.
34 Subsidies are eventually
beneficial for politicians and users, but they are economically inefficient, damag-
ing, or both. If so, CEECs are going to be punished twice for accession: first, by
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32 According to the official explanation, the Commission has lost control over EU funds. The
investigation found more than € 3bn “misused” money.
33 Cf. Walsh, 31.
34 Cf. Tupy 2003, p. 17-18.obtaining quotas and expensive regulation; secondly, by getting subsidies to
worsen the situation.
IV. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
The enlargement from 2004 onwards was designed similarly to previous
ones, in a manner of social engineering: in order to provide a new market for the
EU15 and to prevent costly changes in expensive EU15 regulation, new entrants
will be allowed to join in exchange for accepting the existing rules of the game.
This means that new members have to accept costly regulation, which reduces
their competitiveness, and in exchange they will get subsidies to offset their
adjustment costs. The amount of subsidies for the EU new members from 2004
was not generous compared to previous enlargements when compensation
moved at the level of 2-5% of the GDP of new members. New members were also
promised that they would get larger FDI, speeded up growth rates, and would
bridge the gap with the rest of the Union. Since this is unlikely to happen as we
have seen in previous parts, it may be that for the economically most successful
transition countries – those having well designed economic rules – it would be
better to stay outside the Union.
35 Instead of entering the EU and a nightmare of
bureaucratic supra-national regulation and arbitration over economy, it would
be better to stay outside and to continue to improve economic freedom and the
rule of law – i.e. all those things that contribute to individual freedom and wel-
fare.
Conditions for that already existed, since Estonia
36 was already more free in
economic sense than nearly any of the EU15 countries, while Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania and the Czech Republic were on average equally free as the EU15 aver-
age country (see Table 5). These countries have improved economic freedom
more in 12 years than the average EU country had for decades. Even some rare
authors, whose works are to be found on the EU-official web site, now recognize
this. “In some cases, the accession states demonstrate a greater adherence to lib-
eral economies than established EU members.”
37 Had CEECs opted to be out of
the EU, the neighborhood of reform fatigue, over-regulated and passive giants,
like the EU, would even facilitate and speed up the economic success of the eco-
E
k
o
n
o
m
s
k
i
 
a
n
a
l
i
 
b
r
 
1
6
5
,
 
a
p
r
i
l
 
2
0
0
5
.
 
-
 
j
u
n
 
2
0
0
5
.
48
Miroslav Prokopijevi}
35 “… for the EU and for the new member states, enlargement is a poor deal”. Walsh 2003, p. 7.
Tupy (2003) agrees with this conclusion. 
36 Estonia is ranked just after Luxembourg and Ireland according to the Heritage foundation in
2004, and after UK, Ireland and Luxembourg according to the ranking by the Fraser institute
in 2002. See Table 5 in the text.
37 Walsh, 40.nomically open CEECs. This strategy might induce Brussels’ bureaucracy to
reconsider its policy and to shift to diversity, liberalization and competition. If
the Wonderland changes in a positive way, Alice may consider joining one day, if
that is going to be profitable for her. “First best” – to stay outside the EU and
improve economic freedom and the rule of law – is however consumed through
accession for at least one period of time. “Second best” – to fight for economic
freedom and the rule of law inside the Union – is still available, but in no way
guaranteed.
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
A
n
n
a
l
s
 
n
o
 
1
6
5
,
 
A
p
r
i
l
 
2
0
0
5
 
-
 
J
u
n
e
 
2
0
0
5
49
Alice is not missing Wonderland
  HF 
Index
1    FI 
Index
2 
FI 
Index  (HF+FI)/2   
Rank  Couuntry  2004  Rank  Country  2001  2002  Rank
3  Conutry  Index 
4  Luxemb.  8.23  5  UK  8.2  8.2  1  UK  8.11 
5  Ireland  8.14  8  Ireland  8.0  7.8  2  Luxemb.  8.01 
6  Estonia  8.10  10  Holland  7.8  7.7  3  Ireland  7.98 
7  UK  8.02  11  Finland  7.7  7.7  4  Denmark  7.80 
8  Denmark  8.00  12  Luxemb.  7.7  7.8  5  Estonia  7.80 
12  Sweden  7.75  13  Austria  7.6  7.5  6  Finland  7.66 
14  Cyprus  7.62  14  Denmark  7.6  7.6  7  Holland  7.55 
15  Finland  7.62  16  Estonia  7.5  7.7  8  Sweden  7.52 
18  Germany  7.43  18  Belgium  7.4  7.4  9  Austria  7.40 
19  Holland  7.40  21  Germany  7.3  7.3  10  Germany  7.36 
20  Austria  7.30  25  Portugal  7.2  7.2  11  Belgium  7.21 
22  Belgium  7.02  32  Sweden  7.1  7.3  12  Cyprus  7.11 
23  Lithuania  7.02  35  Hungary  7.0  7.3  13  Italy  6.95 
26  Italy  6.90  36  Italy  7.0  7.0  14  Lithuania  6.91 
27  Spain  6.73  38  Spain  7.0  7.1  15  Spain  6.91 
30  Latvia  6.60  39  Czech rep.  6.9  6.9  16  Portugal  6.86 
31  Portugal  6.52  44  France  6.7  6.8  17  Latvia  6.80 
32  Czech rep.  6.52  45  Greece  6.7  6.9  18  Czech rep.  6.71 
35  Slovak rep.  6.39  54  Latvia  6.6  7.0  19  Hungary  6.65 
37  Malta  6.22  61  Malta  6.4  6.8  20  Malta  6.51 
42  Hungary  6.00  69  Cyprus  6.2  6.6  21  Slovak rep.  6.46 
45  France  5.93  70  Lithuania  6.2  6.8  22  France  6.36 
52  Slovenia  5.62  76  Slovenia  6.1  6.2  23  Greece  6.20 
54  Greece  5.50  79  Poland  6.0  6.4  24  Poland  5.91 
57  Poland  5.47  80  Slovak rep.  6.0  6.6  25  Slovenia  5.91 
  Average  6.96    Average  7.04  7.18    Average  7.07 
 
Note: 1= Index of the Heritage foundation for 2004 (HF), recounted on the scale 0-10; 2 = Index of the
Fraser institute on the scale 0-10 (FI); In both ratings 0 means no economic freedom while 10 means
maximum of economic freedom; 3 = Ranking of the EU25-countries is based on the arithmetic mean of
HF and FI indexes.What is going to happen to the economic freedom and GDP of eight
EUnewcomers from the CEE in forthcoming years basically depends on how
they are going to behave after accession. Countries that will rely on heavy regula-
tion, rentseeking and the heavy hand of the state will become similar to the less
liberal EU15 members,
38 and as a result, they will face stagnation both in invest-
ment and GDP rates. They even will miss the “second best”. 
Although accession was not the best choice for “success stories” among
CEECs, it is not the end of the world after they have once mistakenly acceded.
Their position now is weaker, but the adherents of individual freedom in these
countries do not need to be altogether desperate. The EU25 is rather more a
diverse than a homogeneous unit, and the EU15 will undergo a larger shock
caused by the accession of ten new countries. 
The diversity of the EU is going to be larger after accession of ten countries
than before. There are situations where nearly all newcomers adhere to quite dif-
ferent rules compared to the EU15. For example, all eight CEECs have lower cor-
porate tax rates than the EU – on average 10pp, and lower top rates for income
tax of 11pp.
39 The total tax burden – taxes plus social contributions – in the EU25
is highest in Sweden (50.6% of GDP), Denmark (48.9%) and Belgium (46.6%)
and the lowest in Ireland (28.6%), Latvia (28.8%) and Lithuania (31.3%). The
former group has an average rate of 48.7%, the later one of 29.6% while the
CEECs average is 35.2%.
40 Having such larger differences in mind, it is important
to follow what is going to happen after accession. Are high-tax EU nations going
to suppress low-tax members, say, by enforcing tax harmonization
41 at the higher
tax rates? This has not happened in the EU15. For example, the tax burden in
Sweden was larger by 22pp than that in Ireland, and there were no larger signals
of tax competition. But this may happen if high tax nations offer subsidies to low
tax nations in exchange for their acceptance of higher tax rates. In order for this
to happen all EU15 members should accept this extra-expenditure; although this
is unlikely for now, it can not be excluded in principle. If high-tax nations for any
reason succeed in imposing high taxes over low-tax nations, they themselves may
postpone necessary changes in their over-regulated and expensive economic sys-
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38 The four economically most illiberal EU15-countries, according to the Heritage foundation
index in 2004. are Greece (ranked 54th with index 5.50), France (45th, 5.93), Portugal (31st,
6.52) and Spain (27th, 6.73). The same four are the most illiberal according to the HF/FI aver-
age.
39 Cf. European Commission 2004, p. 8. The VAT rates in the EU15 ran between 15% and 25%,
while the CEECs’ average is 19%.
40 Cf. European Commission 2004, p. 239. Own calculation.
41 First attempt to harmonize direct taxes in EU25 failed in September 2004. It has been pro-
posed by the ECOFIN and backed up by the EU Commission.tems. In this case the EU25 will resemble an even more rigid, centrally harmo-
nized “nirvana” that misses incentives for change, innovation and competition
among jurisdictions.
42
If high tax nations do not succeed in imposing heavy regulation on newcom-
ers, they will be forced to change their own tax systems with high rates and exces-
sive regulation, which is extremely politically costly, and for that reason, the
hightax nations will do everything before remaining with this option. It seems
obvious that the EU after “historical enlargement” is going to be much more
diverse than ever before. This means, that this enlargement may have some unin-
tended consequences. Instead of being a large homogenous and harmonized
bloc, the EU may become divided into groups of comparatively diverse coun-
tries, which tend to move at two or more different speeds. Continued political
integration and harmonization may appear to be impossible tasks in the light of
greater diversity among country members. Instead of leading to a stronger and
politically more integrated Union, the fifth enlargement may provoke a stoppage
or even a set back to integration as conducted up to now. Enlarged diversity
might lead to stalled political integration and division of countries into several
clubs rather than to a further push toward unification and closer political inte-
gration. But this is good news. By siding with more liberal “old members” of the
Union, liberal newcomers may be a decisive factor in preventing a dangerous
political integration and over-regulation and so inspire a comeback to the liberal
economic dimension of the Union. It is surprising that a dirigiste, socialist
design, due to unintended consequences, may lead to a liberal outcome, but this
is not unlikely to happen. In behaving this way liberal newcomers will face some
“aggravated circumstances”. One would be their weaker internal position, due to
a changed structure of incentives in their internal policies and economies. The
other may be pressure from the EU institutions and some larger countries from
the Union, who may share other plans and objectives. Nevertheless, Alice’s battle
is not lost either way.
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42 Cf. Colombatto, 2000.E
k
o
n
o
m
s
k
i
 
a
n
a
l
i
 
b
r
 
1
6
5
,
 
a
p
r
i
l
 
2
0
0
5
.
 
-
 
j
u
n
 
2
0
0
5
.
52
Miroslav Prokopijevi}
REFERENCES
Barysch, K. (2003) Will EU money be the tune
for new members’ catch-up song?,
Transition, vol. 14, no. 4-6, pp. 1, 4-8.
Blundell, J. & Frost, G. (2004) Friend or foe.
What Americans should know about the
European Union, pp. 1-44. Available at:
http://www.iea.org.uk/files/upldarticle71p
df?.pdf
Breuss, F. (2001) Macroeconomic effects of EU
enlargement for old and new members,
Vienna: WiFO, Working paper no. 143.
Caetano, J. / Galego, A. / Vaz, E. / Vieira, C. /
Vieira, I. (2002) The eastward enlargement
of the Eurozone trade and FDI, Ezoneplus
WP no. 7, pp. 1-86. Available at:
www.ezoneplus.org
CESifo (2004) The 2004 enlargement: key eco-
nomic issues, in: Report on the European
economy, Munich: CESifo, pp. 96-118.
Available at:
http://www.cesifo.de/pls/questci/down-
load/EEAG+Report+2004/eeag_report_ch
ap5_2004.pdf
Colombatto, E. (2000) The crisis of Europe’s
centralized federalism: ambiguities of a har-
monized currency union, The independent
review, vol. 4, 4, pp. 533-553. EIU (2004)
World investment prospects, pp. 1-28,
http://graphics.eiu.com/files/ad_pdfs/WIP
_2004.pdf
EU Observer (2003) Billions of Euro needed for
candidates to implement EU laws, January
22. Available at:
www.euobserver.com/index.phtml?sid=15
&aid=9110 European Commission (2003)
Enlargement: what can enterprises in the
new member states expect?, pp. 1-31.
Available at:
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enter-
prise/enlargement/doc/questionsan-
swers.pdf
European Commission (2003a) Comprehensive
monitoring report of the European
Commission on the state of preparedness for
EU membership of the Czech republic,
Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania,
Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and
Slovakia, pp. 1-45. Available at:
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlarge-
ment/report_2003/pdf/summary_paper20
03_full_en.pdf
European Commission (2004) Structure of the
taxation systems in the European Union,
Brussels: EC, pp. 1-334.
Gross, D. & Gonciarz, A. (1996) A note on the
trade potential of Central and Eastern
Europe,  European journal of political
economy, vol. 12, pp. 709-721.
Gwartney, J. & Lawson, R. (Eds)(2004)
Economic freedom of the world 2002,
Vancouver: Fraser Institute, pp. 1-208.
Available at:
http://www.freetheworld.com/2004/efw20
04complete.pdf
IMF (2000) Accession of transition economies to
the European Union: prospects and pres-
sures,  in:  World economic outlook.
October 2000. Focus on transition coun-
tries, Washington: IMF, pp. 138-179.
Available at: www.imf.org
IMF (2003) Foreign direct investment trends and
statistics, Oct. 28, pp. 1-54. Available at:
www.imf.org
Kaitila, V. (2004) Convergence of real GDP per
capita in the EU15: how do the accession
countries fit in?,  Enlargement research
bulletin, January, pp. 1-34. Available at:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/d
ocs/research/jan2004.htm#C
Lejour, A. M. / de Mooj, R. A. / Nahnis, R.
(2001) EU enlargement: economic implica-
tions for countries and industries, CESifo,
CESifo working paper. 
Maliszewska, M. (2004) EU enlargement: bene-
fits of the single market expansion for cur-
rent and new member states. Available at:E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
A
n
n
a
l
s
 
n
o
 
1
6
5
,
 
A
p
r
i
l
 
2
0
0
5
 
-
 
J
u
n
e
 
2
0
0
5
53
Alice is not missing Wonderland
http://www.case.com.pl/upload/publikac-
ja_plik/1861894_273.pdf
O’Driscoll, G. P. a.o. (Eds)(2002) The 2002
index of economic freedom, Washington:
Heritage Foundation & The Wall Street
Journal. Available at:
www.heritage.org/index/2002/
Perlitz, U. (2003) Stahlindustrie: Chancen für
EU-Hütten durch Osterweiterung.
Deutsche Bank Research, December 2003, pp.
12-19, reprinted in Enlargement research
bulletin, January 2004 Available at:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/d
ocs/research/jan2004
Powell, B. (2003) Economic freedom and growth:
the case of the Celtic tiger, Cato journal,
vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 417-430.
Prokopijevic, M. (2002) Does growth further
improve economic freedom?, Turin: ICER
Working papers, WP No. 16/2002.
Available at: www.icer.it
Sauvant, K. P. (2004) Third world TNCs assert
themselves,  FDI (Financial Times), April
05. Available at:
http://www.fdimagazine.com/news/full-
story.php/aid/655/Third_world_TNCs_as
sert_themselves.html
Stanchev, K. at alii (2004) The European Union
financial framework for Bulgaria – does it
change anything, Economic policy review,
April, pp. 1-4,
http://www.ime.bg/en/index/html
Tupy, M. L. (2003) EU enlargement. Costs, ben-
efits, and strategies for Central and Eastern
European countries, Policy analysis (Cato
institute), No. 489, pp. 1-20. Vaubel, R.
(1996)  The constitutional future of the
European Union, in: Europe: A constitution
for the Millenium, pp. 317-324.
Wagner, M. & Hlouskova, J. (2002) The CEECs
real convergence prospects,
Washington: CEPR, CEPR discussion paper no.
3318.
Walsh, J. (2003) EU enlargement: not all it’s
cracked up to be,  Enlargement research
bulletin, January 2004, pp. 1-48,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/d
ocs/research/jan2004.htm#A
Zukrovska, K. et alii (2002) FDI and trade.
Exemplification of Poland and other post-
communist states, Ezoneplus WP no. 7A,
pp. 1-37. Available at: www.ezoneplus.orgE
k
o
n
o
m
s
k
i
 
a
n
a
l
i
 
b
r
 
1
6
5
,
 
a
p
r
i
l
 
2
0
0
5
.
 
-
 
j
u
n
 
2
0
0
5
.
54
Miroslav Prokopijevi}